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Sense and Sensibility 
 
Lawrence Kimmel, Trinity University 
 
. . . his words are like the images of Silenus which open; they are 
ridiculous when you first hear them; he clothes himself in 
language that is like the skin of the wanton satyr—for his talk is of 
pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers, and he is always 
repeating the same things in the same words, so that any ignorant 
or inexperienced person might feel disposed to laugh at him; but 
he who opens the bust and sees what is within will find that they 
are the only words which have a meaning in them, and also the 
most divine, abounding in fair images of virtue, and of the widest 
comprehension, or rather extending to the whole duty of a good 
and honourable man. 
(Symposium, Plato) 
 
 It is no secret that philosophy has gone out of the marketplace, 
nor has it shown up recently in the councils of kings. There seems 
some justified confusion, if not complaint, among an intelligent 
and educated public that philosophy has become a private matter 
among academic professionals. Even then, it often seems to reduce 
to linguistic scepticism or solipsism. This confusion is also felt 
among some philosophers. It is tied up somehow with both the 
conviction and disappointment that the domain of philosophy is 
neither the world nor the mind—that philosophy is indeed, as an 
academic majority contend, merely about language. This claim, 
however, is, if not wrong, at least misleading. I want in what 
follows to see if I can help to correct, or at least clarify, this view 
of the relation between philosophy and language. The result may 
not return philosophy to an over-crowded marketplace, nor to 
empty palaces, but I hope it will do something to restore 
conviction among some philosophers that what we are about can 
and does make a difference to more than ourselves. 
 This is an era, stretching into an age, of “meta-philosophy”. 
The commonplace (if mistaken) tendency among academics to 
think of philosophy as about language may usefully describe what 
fills professional journals, but it is deeply dissatisfying to those 
who have identified with a different, older tradition.  Even so, 
there is, and has been from the beginning, unquestionably an 
intimate relation between philosophy and language. Analytic 
philosophy, we might say, has become obsessed with detailing this 
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relationship. It is, I think, both the detail and the obsession which 
is at the heart of complaints from outside philosophy. 
 What I will try to offer is a view from the bridge, a kind of 
general view of philosophy and language, aided by the work of 
two of the most seminal writers within the tradition of which I am 
here being critical: Ludwig Wittgenstein and O.K. Bouwsma. I 
should say at the outset I am well aware both were hostile toward 
high-bridge reviews, but I know of no other way to proceed. 
 Both Wittgenstein and Bouwsma were “ordinary language 
philosophers”, which I take to be a contemporary name for a kind 
of oral tradition in philosophy, the classical model of which has 
been the activity of Socrates. These two writers and this tradition 
will be the focus of what is constructive and the source of what is 
sound in my remarks about philosophy and language. 
 The written work of both Wittgenstein and Bouwsma was 
devoted to the question (and confusions) of what it is we are doing 
as philosophers. These were philosophers speaking to philosophers 
about philosophy. In this respect, they too seem subject to the 
“privatism” complaint. But the work of these men goes to the heart 
of the issue which seems to separate the concerns of philosophers 
and common men.  They confronted (as now every philosopher 
must) a puzzle and predicament: philosophers seem to be born 
with grey hair and with nothing but language to contend with the 
world. 
 Analytic philosophy seems to hold that the naivete of earlier 
philosophers led them to believe they were pursuing truth about 
the world. Modern insight, to the contrary, dictates that 
philosophical statements so far as they are ever intelligible are not 
about the world, but about language.  This means, e.g., that Plato’s 
Republic, so far as it is philosophical, is not about justice, but about 
the concept “justice”—how the word is used or abused. The 
resulting conviction is that whatever the task of the politician may 
be, the confinements of the philosopher are clear: his proper 
business is limited to comments about language. 
 There is really nothing much new or even modern in this 
position. Plato had already worried about the “bald-headed 
tinkers” bandying words; Nietzsche had bemoaned the “epigoni”.  
It now only turns out that if ordinary man was thrice removed from 
truth, the modern philosopher seems twice removed from ordinary 
man and no closer to the truth. To the ancient and traditional 
predicament the modern philosopher has added only his painful 
self-conscious awareness: “The language is too much with us!”. I 
said there has been a felt retreat from the ordinary affairs of men 
on the part of philosophers, on both a practical and conceptual 
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level—a separation felt both by philosophers and “ordinary men”. 
This separation is codified in the conviction that philosophy is 
about language. 
 I believe the work of Wittgenstein and Bouwsma provides a 
bridge of sorts, a way of bringing together the concerns of ordinary 
men and the activity of the philosopher.  Their work has root in the 
Socratic concern that philosophy make a difference in the lives of 
men, but it fully concedes the linguistic nature of philosophical 
activity. The answer to the question, “What is it we are doing, as 
philosophers?” is the same for both men, and expresses what I 
believe is crucial to the ordinary language or what I have called an 
oral tradition in philosophy: the “love of wisdom” which gives 
philosophy its name, is the pursuit not of truth, but of sense. 
 The perhaps disappointing realisation that philosophy has no 
access to truth about the world is no reason to abandon the world, 
nor for that matter, to abandon truth about the world in favour of 
something else, say, truth about language. 
 It is my conviction that a passion for sense has always been the 
spur of philosophical genius and genuine philosophical activity. In 
saying this, I presume acknowledgement that philosophy does not 
take up the whole space or energy of any life—not even that of 
Socrates. A passion for justice, for beauty and truth are the 
investments we make, or fail to make, in our lives as fathers and 
friends, politicians and enemies. But the philosopher sets himself 
apart, as a philosopher, in that his concern is everywhere to centre 
an issue within the discernable boundaries of sense. While 
Socrates is a model, what has endured in the tradition of western 
philosophy supports the model. For example, the result of nearly 
every Platonic dialogue is the same (which, if one expected truth 
might appear no result at all): we do not have an answer, only a 
better understanding of the question, and of ourselves for having 
asked the question.  
 The lesson we are to learn from engagement with Socrates 
seems to be this: the truth is not within our command, only sense.  
Or to put the same lesson in terms of a later expression: Truth, like 
Grace, we may with effort come to recognise and receive; but no 
man commands it. The promise of the Socratic teaching seems to 
be that if one strives for sense, the truth may emerge. 
 Analytic philosophy, in my overview, has learned this well 
enough, but to avoid folly has fallen into absurdity. It is a little like 
the baby-bathwater problem. The philosopher must abandon a 
certain authority concerning truth, but he must not thereby 
abandon his responsibility to sense and sensibility. It is this latter 
responsibility which Wittgenstein and Bouwsma have preserved in 
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“ordinary language philosophy”. Such philosophy centres in the 
activities and aspirations, as well as the language of “ordinary 
life”. “Ordinary language”, by the way, is a kind of code word for 
talking sense—it has its home in the context of spoken rather than 
written language. Wittgenstein and Bouwsma had, I believe, a 
deep suspicion about the pitfalls and traps of written language, 
especially of a seductive tendency of philosophical thinking to fall 
into a sullen, silent world of extended monologue. 
 It must have occurred to more than one philosopher in what I 
am calling an oral tradition that philosophy cannot be written; it 
can only be spoken. In any event, what sets ordinary language 
philosophy apart from the estrangement suffered by analytic 
philosophy (and keeps it within the domain of public interest and 
concern) is the genuine belief that, if indeed the form and 
substance of philosophy is language, its life is speech. I am no 
historian, but I’d wager odds that throughout western history 
whenever culture comes to a kind of moral or intellectual impasse, 
especially in its written documents and formal institutions, there 
ensues a return to some form of oral tradition which serves to 
re-vitalize the intellectual and spiritual tradition ground down 
through the abuse, standardisation, and institutionalisation of 
language. 
 I want to try to make clear and explicit the connection between 
philosophy and sense, or more particularly “ordinary language 
philosophy” and standards of sense and sensibility. Ordinary 
language, of course, does not so much establish the limits of sense 
as it does centre it. The “ordinary” is not what we aspire to, but 
centre in. So too, sensibility is not a goal in life—at least not for 
most of us—but given the human tendency to abuse power 
(whether of arms or language), it is the common resource to which 
we must at least occasionally hold ourselves and each other. 
 As a matter of everyday concern, sense and sensibility are 
mostly a matter of convenience. But while it is not crucial, or 
even desirable to be always in agreement, it may become critical 
to understand disagreements. It is in such practical imperatives 
that philosophy—and this includes analytic or linguistic 
philosophy— readily finds its tie which binds, an indissoluble 
union in and with the affairs of men, its bondage to the world. It 
is arguable, in this way, that philosophy is burdened with a 
practical moral imperative: to ensure a basis for understanding 
disagreements. In the end this is far more fundamental and 
important than constituting any authority for settling 
disagreements. This shows, I believe, the moral priority of sense 
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over truth, one which we would do well to better understand. It is 
a way in which philosophy can and does make a difference. 
 The following crude, but I hope obvious and 
selfrecommending, example may help to show both the practical 
relevance and sense-centering function of ordinary language 
philosophy. Consider the simple and general distinctions which 
any speaker of the language learns and easily understands: 
 
— We cut a Flower.  
— We kill an animal.  
— We murder a human being. 
 
It will be apparent, I think, that this arrangement of sentences 
which makes distinctions could become the basis for a lecture or 
an essay in meta-ethics or meta-physics. But, of course, the 
distinctions themselves are made in ordinary language, and indeed 
one could very well argue that even the “priority ranking” 
suggested by such serial expression is also reflected in the 
language generally and not merely forced by philosophical yoking. 
But quite apart from philosophical subtleties (or banalities), it is 
clear that ordinary language is deeply philosophical: these 
expressions and distinctions tell us a great deal about how we look 
at the world, how we feel about and act toward ourselves relative 
to the things and beings which are in that world. 
 The point of primary concern, however, is that in making these 
distinctions clear, we help to establish the limits of sense and 
standards of sensibility. We do not thereby establish truth, nor can 
these distinctions legitimately put an end either to argument or 
inquiry. 
 It is in such ways, I hope you will agree, that philosophy—at 
least ordinary language philosophy—can centre sense and nourish 
sensibility. In the homely and over-simple example I have given, 
the only philosophical activity is in the arrangement of distinctions 
already codified in ordinary speech. Such philosophical activity is 
merited normally only for a particular purpose, e.g. to establish a 
frame of reference within which a discussion can proceed, a 
decision be made. The present example is admittedly crude and 
would require some ingenuity in giving a concrete context, but I 
expect the reader could provide one, even for one so general. 
 Ordinary language, the language we speak, here as elsewhere, 
provides not a philosophical standard for truth, but a foundation 
for sense—it expresses a standard of sensibility shared by a 
community of human beings who speak this language. 
 I have put a good deal of emphasis on the difference between 
spoken and written language, and the relative trust one may have 
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that the spoken language reflects sense. I do not mean to be 
foolish: of course one can (people do) write sense; one can (people 
do) talk nonsense. Both Wittgenstein and Bouwsma indeed held 
that the surest training for talking sense was to write it. My 
emphasis on spoken language or oral context is only that one must, 
as Socrates did, hold not only to what is common, but to what is 
living in our language, especially when the issue is sense.  
 The importance of all this, I hope, will be apparent. Surely a 
major issue today—intellectually, culturally, spiritually—is that 
of sense. To put it negatively, ours no less than Socrates’, is a 
time in which sense and sensibility suffer from a devaluation of 
language. Whether that in turn is a result of aesthetic exhilaration 
or moral exhaustion is hard to determine, but the philosophical 
imperative is the same. When cultures and sub-cultures contend 
for dominance by claim to public or private truth, the best 
recourse, perhaps the only one, is a return to sense. Socrates 
showed by example that, when one has lost confidence in who 
commands the authority of truth, a reasonable philosophical 
strategy is to relinquish the idea of truth (Socratic Ignorance) and 
inquire rather into the business of sense. 
 This is the genesis of Socratic philosophy. It is also what 
Wittgenstein and Bouwsma were about, and there is a whole 
tradition in philosophy, centering in Socrates. of which they form a  
part of and continuance. I have called this an “oral” tradition, and 
perhaps that is somewhat misleading, although I have tried to 
explain what I mean. 
 I will try now to summarise a view of analytic philosophy, of 
which “ordinary language philosophy” is a small and more vital 
part. It has essentially two roots. The first is a dialogical tradition, 
centering in the life of Socrates: its central concern is sense. The 
second is a dialectical tradition, centering in the formal reconstruc-
tions of Plato: its central concern is truth. In both traditions there is 
an idea of movement, of interchange, of life—but one is actual and 
real, the other abstract and imagined. In both traditions, however, 
the socket in which everything turns is language. The only 
question is how to breathe life into language to preserve sense. To 
that question Wittgenstein and Bouwsma have made answer. 
 Concluding, I want to set out in series, some remarks ancient 
and current, which I take to connect philosophy and language in a 
way which supports my remarks on the primacy of “ordinary 
language” and philosophical sense. They serve to connect, for me, 
a framework of an informal tradition within which I believe many, 
many of us as philosophers work. This series also has functioned 
as the parameter of my thinking in this essay. I hope the “citations” 
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will be familiar to you. I make no claim to textual accuracy, but I 
most certainly do to arguable philosophical sense. 
 
1. Man (Df.) is an animal with speech. Aristotle)
1
 
2. We look at the world through our language. (Aristotle)
2
 




4. We learn virtue, as we learn to speak our language. (Plato)
4
 
5. Ordinary language (speech) is all right. (Wittgenstein)
5
 




 I give only a short comment on the connections I have in 
mind: Aristotle and Plato already express not only the intimate 
connection of philosophy and language, but of the very 
dependency of human beings for identity and community on the 
vital activity of speech. Wittgenstein emerges, of course, at the 
other end of the philosophical tradition, still concerned with this 
intimate relation of language and life, but now facing the tangles 
of language turned on itself—the “linguistic predicament” I 
referred to in the opening part of this essay. Wittgenstein’s remark 
that “we feel as if we had to repair a spider’s web with our 
fingers” is a poignant expression of the predicament. He does, 
however, have an answer to the entanglement of the mind in its 
                                                 
1




 Organon, et al. 
3




 The Blue Book, p. 28. 
6
 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Prop. 7 
7
 These “citations” are offered neither as proof nor evidence of an oral tradition. They 
are framed to present a way of understanding, of reading, out a certain view of the 
centrality and continuity of spoken language within our common philosophical 
heritage. Number’s 2-4 are not direct quotations, and/require some comment’ perhaps 
separate essays. The language in each is my invention, but I believe they are defensible 
renderings of well known texts 
     Number’s 2 and 3 represent the sense of Aristotle’s views on the priority, and the 
integrative nature of language in human life and community. Certainly my emphasis 
on speech is viable. Aristotle surely did not intend to make “humanness” depend on the 
ability to write, nor imagine the life of a community contingent upon memorandums; 
that remained for a much later civilisation, one far removed from the polis.  
     Number 4: Plato has Protagoras respond to Socrates’ query “Who are the teachers 
of virtue?” with an answering question: “Who are the teachers of Greek?”. This is 
more than rhetoric, and more than a nod by Plato to what was substantial within the 
Sophistic tradition. My extrapolation of this exchange into the form of a claim by 
Plato, for the purposes I’ve stated will I hope pass without a compromise of 
philosophical sense. 
     More broadly and importantly, I hope the method of framing and the sense of this 
series of remarks will be self-recommending in terms of your own reading of these 
philosophers. 
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own making: return to sense, to ordinary language; that is enough, 
that alone can restore sensibility. 
 Wittgenstein also has a kind of simple enabling dictum to 
effect a return to philosophical sense, one which Bouwsma in turn 
simplifies. So, to the above series of remarks add: 
 
7. “Don’t think, look!” (Wittgenstein) 
8. “Don’t look, listen!” (Bouwsma) 
 
These are both remarks about language and sense, warnings to 
philosophers about the limits of language, and signposts for 
sensibility. However, it is important to understand that neither 
Wittgenstein nor Bouwsma were warning us to act rather than 
think. Their abrupt remarks are not directions (directly) on how to 
live, or live better lives. The prescriptions remain essentially 
philosophical. They are not, e. g., on the practical (sceptical) 
reminder-level of Hume’s “Remember to leave by the first floor 
door”.  
 This may, in the end, seem once again to “limit” philosophy to 
language. But that is, finally, the point. The domain of language— 
spoken, shared language—is the domain of sense and sensibility. 
Whatever is invented or created must grow from the germ. To 
fully realise the limits of language is to fully empower the speaker: 
that is the substance of Socratic Ignorance, and also, of course, 
Socratic wisdom. 
 In an age and in a profession where the inclination is to say 
everything, it is remarkable surely to find a thinker or two who 
insist, to the contrary, that the more difficult and important thing is 
to say something, or better, to show the sense in anything. This is 
what I take ordinary language philosophy to be—a corrective to 
the extravagance of our time. It is, undeniably, a step backwards: 
from truth to sense. But it is what our time requires. There is an 
adage I’ll borrow from current therapeutic practice to close, one 
which fits: “Sometimes, the only way to catch up is to slow 
down”. 
 I want finally to say something personal about Oets Bouwsma 
in connection with the above, since this is an issue of this journal 
dedicated to him. He spent his life in thoughtful and vigorous 
pursuit of what everyone else around him already had— or thought 
they had. He strove for sense, where other philosophers 
presupposed it. I’m not sure whether or not he thought truth was 
out of reach. One thing is certain: he regarded philosophy, genuine 
philosophy, as the pursuit of sense in the service of truth. None of 
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